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In the last decade, metametaphysics has excited great interest among profes-
sional philosophers . If Peter van Inwagen’s assessment that before that time 
it was the most neglected topic in contemporary metaphysics is correct, the 
current situation cannot be more different . The change is largely due to the 
appearance of the seminal collection of essays edited by David Chalmers, 
David Manley and Ryan Wasserman, Metametaphysics, in 2009 . Fast-grow-
ing and diverse academic production in this, only recently established, area 
of inquiry has created the need for a systematic survey of its main viewpoints, 
open debates, and various conceptual tools . Tuomas Tahko’s new book fills 
that lacuna: it is the first introductory account of the study of foundations, 
methodology and epistemology of metaphysics, published as a part of the 
Cambridge Introduction to Philosophy series . It is intended as a textbook for 
graduate and advanced undergraduate students, but since the presented ma-
terial presupposes only the basic knowledge of metaphysics the book can also 
be of use to readers not working in philosophy but having a general interest 
in metaphysics . However, Tahko does not only give an overview of the central 
questions and most influential answers in metametaphysics, but in various 
places he has neatly incorporated his own, broadly neo-Aristotelian views on 
the matter; professional philosophers will surely find Tahko’s astute remarks 
and original insights thought-provoking and interesting in their own right .
The book consists of a preface, nine chapters, a glossary with explana-
tions of the meaning of some more technical terms, and an index . In the first 
chapter, Tahko outlines the content of every section and indicates that, even 
though many authors use the terms “metametaphysics” and “metaontology” 
interchangeably, he understands the latter discipline only as a special branch 
of the former . Such a choice is perhaps influenced by Tahko’s neo-Aristote-
lian predilections, as neo-Aristotelians typically attach more weight to the 
question of determining the “hierarchy of being” than to the question of 
what there is . The commending consequence of this approach is that a wider 
range of topics is covered than, for instance, in the Metametaphysics anthol-
ogy, where almost all of the papers are focused on metaontology – in Tahko’s 
book it is the subject of the next three chapters only .
Contemporary metaontology is usually considered to stem from the dis-
pute Quine had with Carnap in the late 1940s and 1950s . Quine is often 
credited with reviving metaphysics after the long reign of antimetaphysically 
oriented movements in the twentieth-century philosophy and regarded as 
the founder of the mainstream position in metaontology: the “heavyweight” 
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realism, to use Chalmers’s phrase . Deflationists of various sorts and antireal-
ists are, on the other hand, commonly perceived as members of Carnap’s 
lineage . Tahko points out, agreeing in that respect with a number of authors 
in the Metametaphysics anthology, that such a perception results from a some-
what distorted interpretation of the historical Quine-Carnap dispute . Tahko 
criticizes Quine’s famous method for determining ontological commitments, 
which reduces the question of existence to that of the domain of quantifica-
tion, and stresses that there are clear cases of ontologically noncommittal 
uses of quantification . After examining different ways to understand Carnap’s 
well-known distinction between external and internal questions and his lin-
guistic pluralism, Tahko concludes, following Matti Eklund, that accepting 
the external/internal distinction does not by itself lead to linguistic pluralism, 
but only with the extra assumption that there are different frameworks which 
are equally adequate for describing the world .
The last thesis is exactly what Eli Hirsch claims . Hirsch, a major advocate 
of metaontological deflationism, believes that the most charitable interpreta-
tion of the claims conflicting parties make when discussing physical-object 
ontology is the one according to which they ascribe different meanings to 
the existential quantifier . In his view, these disputes are merely verbal, as the 
apparent ontological rivals agree on all the facts but use different languages to 
express them; moreover, their languages are expressively equal as they cover 
the same set of characters . Theodore Sider argued against Hirsch that in on-
tology we are not just aiming to express all the facts but also to disclose 
their structure: according to Sider, there is a single meaning of the existential 
quantifier which carves at the joints . For Sider, metaphysical disputes are 
substantial, as the opposing parties use the quantifier in its sole natural mean-
ing . Tahko admits that Sider’s “ontological realism” is much closer to his neo-
Aristotelian view than Hirsch’s deflationary position, but, instead of simply 
taking sides, he rejects the general Quinean assumption which underlies the 
Hirsch-Sider dispute: adopting critical points of Kit Fine, Tahko renounces 
the idea that quantification is a reliable guide to ontological commitments .
Following Carrie Jenkins, Tahko points out that the term “ontological 
realism” can be understood in three different ways: 1) as a thesis that onto-
logical disputes are substantial; 2) as a thesis that there is a single privileged 
quantifier meaning; and 3) as a thesis that there are objective ontological 
facts . The three theses seem prima facie independent: Sider would endorse 
all three, while Hirsch would accept the third only, which is sufficient, ac-
cording to classifications of Chalmers and Karen Bennett, to be categorized 
as a realist . It is thus the rejection of the third thesis which is characteristic of 
ontological antirealism . Tahko remarks that conventionalism is often left out 
of such classifications, probably because it is a difficult position to uphold: 
although more akin to antirealism than realism, Tahko stresses that conven-
tionalism neither implies nor is implied by antirealism .
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The remaining five chapters of the book are dedicated to epistemology 
of metaphysics and the relationship between science and metaphysics .
In the chapter on grounding and ontological dependence, Tahko care-
fully distinguishes between various closely related notions of ontological de-
pendence and discusses conceptual links between them . Citing well-known 
examples from Fine, Tahko shows that modal notions of rigid and generic 
existential dependence are too coarse-grained for providing metaphysical ex-
planations; the notion of grounding, or of essential dependence, prominent in 
Aristotle but only lately re-introduced in contemporary metaphysics by Fine 
and E .J . Lowe, seems much better suited for the task due to its finer structure . 
Grounding, Tahko argues, will be theoretically advantageous only if essence is 
regarded as prior to metaphysical modality . In the neo-Aristotelian approach 
which Tahko underwrites, facts about essences are non-modal and ground 
metaphysical necessity; indeed, metaphysics is nothing else than an a priori 
inquiry into essences . It is thus important not to confuse grounding with the 
modal notions of ontological dependence in the vicinity, and also to keep it 
apart from truthmaking – the main difference being that truthmaking is usu-
ally understood as a relation between entities of different categories, which 
need not be the case with grounding . When analysing connections between 
these two notions, Tahko remarks that truthmaking may be considered a spe-
cial case of grounding, namely truth-grounding . Interestingly, he suggests that 
this strategy would put pressure towards recognizing a multitude of differ-
ent notions of grounding, since truth-grounding fails to possess an important 
feature commonly associated with grounding – transitivity . The plurality of 
grounding could endanger the explanatory power of the notion and, con-
sequently, the whole neo-Aristotelian project . Tahko seems undecided here 
whether it would be better to deny that truth-grounding is a genuine case of 
grounding, or to accept that there are many different relations of grounding 
– some transitive, others not – and develop a more complex structure with, 
perhaps, a generic notion of grounding and multiple subspecies .
Many philosophers assume that there is a fundamental level of reality at 
which the chains of ontological dependence eventually terminate and that 
the proper task of metaphysics is to describe this ontological basis and recon-
struct the towering hierarchy . The fundamental level is often conceived as 
populated with mereological simples; James Ladyman and Don Ross, how-
ever, have argued that physics tells against mereological atoms, since such 
atoms are usually thought of as independent agents, which is at odds with 
quantum entanglement . Tahko points out that ontological fundamentality 
should not be understood in mereological terms, and that Jonathan Schaf-
fer’s monism, according to which everything is grounded in the universe as 
a whole, is also a version of ontological foundationalism . Tahko, quite origi-
nally, suggests that we need not give up on the “levels of reality” metaphor 
218 Prolegomena 15 (2) 2016
even if endlessly descending chains of (generic) existential dependence are 
allowed, as long as after a finite number of levels the same structure starts 
repeating itself all the way down: in his view, the presupposition of the onto-
logical hierarchy precludes neither the infinity of ever simpler entities nor the 
infinity of levels, but infinite complexity .
In modal epistemology, Tahko advocates the hybrid view which com-
bines some aspects of modal rationalism with some of modal empiricism, and 
which rests on his account of the relationship between a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge . He calls attention to cases that can be classified into both of these 
categories with equal right and points out that only very seldom, if ever, we 
encounter pieces of pure a priori or a posteriori knowledge . Tahko suggests 
that the distinction a priori / a posteriori is more productively applied to rea-
soning than to truth or knowledge, and that metaphysical knowledge, just as 
scientific knowledge, is usually reached by integrating a priori and a posteriori 
methods . Our knowledge of what is metaphysically possible is based on our 
understanding of essences, which is always to some extent a priori – Tahko 
thus labels his position as permissive modal rationalism . Although reached 
by a priori reasoning, a new piece of modal knowledge is the result of taking 
into account the already established empirical basis and is later subjected to 
empirical testing: if added to the stock, an a priori piece of knowledge can 
transform the previous a posteriori basis in radical and unpredictable ways; in 
Lowe’s words, this process continues in “cyclical manner, by alternating stages 
of a priori and a posteriori inquiry” – Tahko calls this relationship “bootstrap-
ping” .
Tahko points out that intuitions and thought experiments are two ir-
replaceable sources of metaphysical knowledge . Claiming that intuitions are 
to thought experiments what perceptions are to experiments may be far-
stretched, but the analogy nevertheless contains some truth . In contrast to 
perceptions, intuitions may be of abstract entities; however, it would be 
wrong to conclude from that, Tahko maintains, that intuitions reduce to 
linguistic or conceptual competence . For Tahko, intuitions are a priori, but 
empirically informed – the apparent tension in this claim dissipates if one 
recalls his theory of the bootstrapping relation between the a priori and the 
a posteriori . Intuitions quite often have a heuristic function, but, in Tahko’s 
view, their role is not therewith exhausted: in some situations, especially in 
thought experiments, intuitions provide evidence, even though it is fallible . 
While experiments are designed to determine what is actual, thought experi-
ments test the metaphysical possibility: the former terminate in observations, 
the latter in intuitions . The function thought experiments perform in sci-
ence, Tahko persuasively argues, is not as radically different from their role 
in philosophy as some scientist or philosophers of science would have us 
believe .
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In regard to the relationship between metaphysics and science, Tahko 
believes, following Lowe, that science and metaphysics (properly understood) 
complement each other in a fruitful way . Tahko takes the middle course be-
tween understanding metaphysics as completely autonomous and as wholly 
naturalized, and labels his reconciliatory view as moderately naturalized met-
aphysics . Metaphysics, according to him, neither occupies so superior a posi-
tion as to be able to flagrantly contravene the findings of empirical sciences, 
nor so ancillary a position as to reduce to merely unifying the already estab-
lished scientific results . Instead, it has a semi-autonomous status: it is an a 
priori exploration of the realm of the metaphysically possible, which precedes 
empirical investigations in science . Before discovering actual properties of an 
object by scientific means, we need to know its essence and, consequently, 
how this object could or could not be, delimiting thus the range of experi-
ences we might have with it . In Lowe’s opinion, we have direct cognitive 
access to essences and it is from our knowledge of essences that we derive 
truths about metaphysical possibilities . This is the point at which Tahko im-
portantly diverges from Lowe, as Tahko claims that, in some cases at least, 
our cognition of essences is not as direct as Lowe assumes: full essences of 
natural kinds and chemical elements, for instance, could only have become 
known after some thorough scientific investigations had been successfully 
conducted, which, in their own turn, had relied upon previously accepted 
metaphysical hypotheses . It is again the dialectical bootstrapping between the 
a priori and the a posteriori – rather than the sharing of a method or a subject 
of inquiry – which unites metaphysics and science into a single endeavour 
of discovering the world’s structure: according to Tahko, the metaphysical 
part of this metaphysics-cum-science compound helps us interpret and make 
sense of our theories, while the scientific part makes them empirically test-
able .
An Introduction to Metametaphysics is clearly written and enjoyable to 
read . Tahko manages to present and analyse some hard metaphysical and 
metametaphysical issues in an accessible and stimulating way . Abundant ex-
amples from science shed better light on how science and metaphysics can 
both be concerned with discovering the world’s structure and still be using 
different methods: comparing metaphysics to science helps the reader un-
derstand the specific role of metaphysics in today’s inquiry and, indeed, its 
necessity .
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